The Effect of the Bribery Act 2010. by Arnell, Paul & Evans, Nicola
  
 
AUTHOR(S): 
 
 
TITLE:  
 
 
YEAR:  
 
Publisher citation: 
 
 
 
OpenAIR citation: 
 
 
 
Publisher copyright statement: 
 
 
 
 
 
OpenAIR takedown statement: 
 
 This publication is made 
freely available under 
________ open access. 
 
 
 
 
 
This is the ______________________ version of an article originally published by ____________________________ 
in __________________________________________________________________________________________ 
(ISSN _________; eISSN __________). 
This publication is distributed under a CC ____________ license. 
____________________________________________________
 
Section 6 of the “Repository policy for OpenAIR @ RGU” (available from http://www.rgu.ac.uk/staff-and-current-
students/library/library-policies/repository-policies) provides guidance on the criteria under which RGU will 
consider withdrawing material from OpenAIR. If you believe that this item is subject to any of these criteria, or for 
any other reason should not be held on OpenAIR, then please contact openair-help@rgu.ac.uk with the details of 
the item and the nature of your complaint. 
 
 
The Effect of the Bribery Act 2010 
 
Dr Paul Arnell, Reader in Law, Robert Gordon University 
Ms Nicola Evans, Solicitor 
 
Introduction 
 
The Bribery Act 2010 (the Act) is a notable statute that brought about a 
whole-scale reform of bribery-related offences in Scotland and the rest of 
the United Kingdom (UK).1 As the Explanatory Notes to the Act state “The 
purpose of the Act is to reform the criminal law of bribery to provide for a 
new consolidated scheme of bribery offences to cover bribery both in the 
United Kingdom and abroad”.2 It was commonly assumed that the Act 
would have meaningful and material consequences in the form of criminal 
prosecutions. Indeed, the Act was passed because of the UK’s “… poor 
record in prosecuting offences”.3 The reason for this centred upon, in the 
words of Jack Straw, the old law being “outdated, complex and, in some 
respects, uncertain in its effect”, with the result that it was difficult for 
“investigators and prosecutors to apply the law sensibly”.4 The Act was 
passed to address these deficiencies. It is reasonable to assume, then, that 
prosecutions and convictions would have followed the Act’s entry into force 
on 1 July 2011. These have been few and far between. They are, instead, 
only one of number of effects that can be discerned.5 This article identifies, 
describes and scrutinises the various effects of the Act, and in doing so 
highlights the differences between Scotland and the rest of the UK in law 
and practice in the area.   
 
Six main effects of the Act can be identified. These are changes to the 
substantive law, the issuance of guidance by the Ministry of Justice and the 
revision or enhancement of corporate compliance programmes, the 
amendment of commercial contracts, several prosecutions and convictions, 
the expansion in scope of new prosecution policies and the UK partially 
addressing its international legal obligations in the field.  
 
																																																								
1 The Act has spawned a considerable body academic and professional literature, 
including Rose, C., The UK Bribery Act 2010 and accompanying guidance: belated 
implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, (2012) 61(2) ICLQ 484 and 
Sullivan, G., The Bribery Act 2010: Part 1 - An Overview, (2011) 2 CLR 87. In a 
Scottish context see Arnell, P., and Evans, N., The Bribery Act 2010 in Scotland, 
(2013) 81 Scottish Law Gazette 93 and Arnell, P., The New Crimes of Bribery in 
Scotland, (2010) 78 Scottish Law Gazette 42.  
2  The Explanatory Notes are cited at: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/notes/contents. 
3  Bribery Bill [HL] Research Paper 10/19, 1 March 2010, at p 1, cited at 
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/lib/research/rp2010/rp10-
019.pdf. 
4 House of Commons, Hansard Debates, 3 March 2010, Column 947. 
5 The effects of the Act are the focus of this article, as opposed to its effectiveness. 
In other words, it is the consequences of the Act per se that are the subject of 
discussion, not those consequences relative to a third factor, such as the level of 
bribery and corruption committed by UK nationals and companies.  
Effect 1 – Changes to the Substantive Law 
 
The most immediate and apparent effect of the Act is the replacement of 
long-standing bribery-related crimes with new offences. The Act repealed 
and replaced all the previous law at common law and under statute. 
Repealed were the common law crimes, in Scotland, “… to bribe and 
attempt to bribe a judicial officer and for the officer himself to take a bribe”6 
and, in England and Wales, of “... the receiving or offering [of] any undue 
reward by or to any person whatsoever, in a public office, in order to 
influence his behaviour in office, and incline him to act contrary to the 
known rules of honesty and integrity”.7 The repealed statutory offences 
were found in the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889 and the 
Prevention of Corruption Act 1906.  
 
Introduced by the Act were two general bribery offences, a specific bribery 
of a foreign public official offence and a corporate offence of failing to 
prevent bribery. The two general offences criminalise the direct or indirect 
offering, promising or giving of a financial or other advantage (in section 1) 
and the requesting, agreeing to receive or receiving of a financial or other 
advantage (in section 2). The Act requires that the offering etcetera take 
place in circumstances amounting to the improper performance of a 
relevant function or activity. A relevant function or activity includes, by 
section 3(2), any activity performed in the course of a person's employment 
or by or on behalf of a body corporate or unincorporate. The performance 
of a relevant function is improper if it is not performed in good faith, 
impartially, or it breaches a position of trust. The two offences may be 
committed by individuals, bodies corporate, partnerships and senior 
managers of a body corporate.  
 
The third offence created by the Act, under section 6, provides that it is an 
offence for a person to bribe a foreign official (promise or give a financial 
or other advantage) with an intention to influence him in his capacity as 
such. The offence requires an intention to obtain or retain business or an 
advantage in the conduct of business. It also requires the prosecution to 
prove that the foreign official was not permitted nor required by law to be 
influenced. Of particular note here are corporate hospitality and 
promotional expenditure. The possibility of bribery charges resulting from 
this type of expenditure exercised the professional press in and around the 
enactment of the Act. Assuaging this in part was the Guidance about 
Procedures which Relevant Commercial Organisations can put into Place to 
Prevent Persons Associated with them from Bribing, published in March 
2011. It provides “The Government does not intend for the Act to prohibit 
reasonable and proportionate hospitality and promotional or other similar 
business expenditure intended for these purposes”. 8  The ambit of the 
																																																								
6 Hume, Commentaries , Vol. 1, pp 407-408. 
7 Cecil Turner, J.W., Russell on Crime, 12th Edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 
1964, p.381.  
8 At p 12, cited at http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/legislation/bribery-act-
2010-guidance.pdf. Hereinafter the section 9 Guidance, on account of the 
Government being obliged to issue it under section 9 of the Act, it is discussed 
below.  
offences within sections 1, 2, and 6 is notable. All three apply if there is 
either a territorial or relationship connection between the alleged offender 
or crime and the UK. A requisite relationship connection exists if the accused 
is a citizen, resident, body corporate or partnership of or within the UK.9 
Significantly, section 14 of the Act provides that where bodies corporate 
and Scottish partnerships have been found guilty of an offence under 
sections 1, 2, and 6 senior officers and partners will also be liable if the 
offence was committed with that person’s consent or connivance. The effect 
of this is to open to criminal liability senior managers who did not act as the 
controlling mind of the company for the purposes of the identification 
principle of corporate liability.10  
 
The fourth and arguably most significant offence under the Act is found in 
section 7. It criminalises the failure to prevent bribery committed by 
relevant commercial organisations. Particularly, a commercial organisation 
may be found guilty under section 7 where it failed to prevent conduct that 
would amount to the commission of an offence under sections 1 or 6 of the 
Act. That individual who engaged in the conduct (the ‘associated person’) 
need not have been convicted of one of the offences. There is, however, an 
obligation on the prosecution to establish beyond reasonable doubt that 
such an offence has been committed. It is this crime that has led to the 
greatest response in the corporate community in the form of enhanced 
compliance programmes and amendments to commercial contracts, 
discussed below. This is a result of the breadth of enterprises that it covers, 
its strict liability, and the possibility of the extraterritorial acts of agents and 
employees creating domestic criminal liability (its territorial and personal 
ambit). 
 
The section 7 offence applies to ‘relevant commercial organisations’. These 
include bodies incorporated within the UK and those incorporated outwith 
the UK where they carry on at least part of their business within it. Also 
included are partnerships under the Partnership Act 1890. ‘Part of a 
business’ is not defined by the Act, however it has been noted that a UK 
representative office or agent may be sufficient whilst a London stock 
market listing may not be.11 The section 7 offence does not require the 
accused to act with a particular state of mind. It is a strict liability offence. 
An organisation can be found guilty when the offence is committed by 
someone who performs services on its behalf. The commercial organisation 
itself, in the form of its controlling mind, need not intend that it be 
committed, or be aware that the offence is to be committed. The associated 
person must act with an intention to obtain or retain business or an 
advantage for the commercial organisation. A defence to the crime, in 
																																																								
9 The previous law on bribery had been given explicit extraterritorial affect, albeit 
not as expansive, under ss 69 and 68 of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003 
in Scotland and ss 109 and 108 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 
in England and Wales. 
10 Corporate criminal liability is discussed below. 
11  The Government expects a common sense approach to be taken by the 
prosecution and judiciary such that companies who do not have a “demonstrable 
business presence in the United Kingdom” do not get caught, see the section 9 
Guidance, supra note 8 at paras 34-36.  
section 7(2), applies where the organisation can prove that it had in place 
adequate procedures designed to prevent bribery. Similar to the offences 
within sections 1, 2, and 6 that under section 7 has a wide territorial and 
personal ambit. Section 12(5) of the Act provides that it does not matter 
whether the acts or omissions which form part of the offence take part in 
the UK or elsewhere. It may be wholly extraterritorial. The offence’s 
personal ambit turns upon the definition of an ‘associated person’. An 
associated person, by section 8, is one who performs services for or on 
behalf of the company. He or she need not have any connection with the 
UK, and the precise capacity of that person is immaterial.  
 
The changes to the substantive law wrought by the Act are not limited to 
the criminal law and crimes of bribery. There are a number of others. One 
such change is the amendment to public procurement regulations. 
Regulation 21(1)(c) of the Public Contracts (Scotland) Regulations12 adds 
convictions under sections 1 and 6 of the Act to the list of offences which 
result in the mandatory exclusion of suppliers at the selection stage in the 
award of public contracts. There is similar provision in England and Wales. 
Notably both statutory instruments are silent on the section 7 offence.13 
Similar debarment exists in EU law under article 45 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the Coordination of Procedures for the 
Award of Public Works Contracts, Public Supply Contracts and Public Service 
Contracts.14 A quasi-legislative effect of the Act is the publication of specific 
sentencing guidelines covering the new crimes of bribery. These apply in 
England and Wales. The provisions within Criminal Justice and Licensing 
(Scotland) Act 2010 creating a Scottish Sentencing Council are not yet in 
force. The Sentencing Council in England and Wales published its Definitive 
Guideline in regard to Fraud, Bribery and Money Laundering on 23 May 
2014. It entered into force on 1 October 2014. It provides a detailed scheme 
for the assessment of a sentence of a person convicted of an offence under 
sections 1, 2 and 6 of the Act and of a corporate offender convicted under 
sections 1, 2, 6 and 7.15 The Guideline iterates a multi-step approach to 
sentence determination for both individuals and bodies corporate.  
 
Effect 2 – The Section 9 Guidance and Revised Corporate 
Compliance Programmes  
 
A second main effect of the Act is the section 9 Guidance and, related to it, 
revised corporate compliance programmes. The Guidance is significant 
because it contains detailed provision on what will constitute ‘adequate 
procedures’ to prevent bribery. As noted, adequate procedures may be the 
basis of a defence under section 7(2) of the Act. The Guidance contains six 
principles which are necessarily general and somewhat vague. The wide 
																																																								
12 SI 2012/88. 
13 See Novak R., Henty P., and Tullis C., The Bribery Act and its Interaction with 
the Public Procurement Rules in the UK, (2011) 5 Public Procurement Law Review 
230. 
14 Directive 2004/18/EC, article 45(2)(c). 
15  Cited at 
http://sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/Fraud_bribery_and_money_launde
ring_offences_-_Definitive_guideline.pdf.  
range of commercial organisations and the circumstances in which they do 
business are amongst the reasons for this. In essence, the Guidance 
provides that commercial organisations should apply an effective set of 
anti-bribery procedures in light of the particular risks they face. Principle 1, 
for instance, iterates the need for proportionate principles and procedures 
in light of the bribery risks the commercial organisation faces and the 
nature, scale, and complexity of its activities. The remaining principles 
within the Guidance relate to management commitment, risk assessment, 
due diligence, communication and monitoring and review.  
 
Related to the section 9 Guidance are revised corporate compliance 
programmes relating to bribery. Evidence of this effect of the Act is not 
difficult to find. The Guidance itself encourages commercial organisations 
to publish their compliance programmes. Many do, and refer to the Act and 
Guidance as amongst the factors conditioning their policies. The Wood 
Group plc, for example, makes explicit reference to the Act (as well as the 
US Foreign and Corrupt Practices Act 1977) in its ethics policy and provides 
guidance to assist employees in understanding what is required of them.16 
The company’s June 2013 Business and Ethics Policy provides “Wood Group 
and Wood Group Personnel may be subject to anti-bribery legislation, 
including the… UK Bribery Act 2010… the UK legislation relates to the 
bribery of both public or government officials and everyone in the private 
sector. The legislation prohibits bribery even when it is committed outside 
these countries’ own borders”.17 Exxonmobil makes a similar reference to 
the Act. In what can be seen as a specific effect of the Guidance, in that it 
includes the requirement of training staff,  ExxonMobil’s website provides 
that “… in 2012, approximately 31,000 employees took part in anti-
corruption training. This training covers the basics of the FCPA, the United 
Kingdom Bribery Act …”.18 There is little doubt that the Act has had an 
impact upon corporate compliance policies, with one author noting that it 
has been “… a catalyst for corporations to revisit or introduce anti-bribery 
systems and controls that they never had before, putting bribery firmly on 
the corporate agenda of UK businesses”.19  
 
Effect 3 – Amendment of Commercial Contracts 
 
The amendment of commercial contracts by way of the addition or revision 
of a clause or clauses relating to bribery is a third main effect of the Act. 
This is related to the effect just discussed in that commercial organisations 
have acted to meet their potential criminal liability in this way. Simply, 
contracts have been amended to include new or revised anti-bribery 
clauses. This can be seen in both industry-wide initiatives taking the form 
																																																								
16 Cited at http://www.woodgroup.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/about-
us/WoodGroup-BusinessEthicsPolicy.pdf.  
17 Ibid at p 7. 
18 See http://corporate.exxonmobil.com/en/investors/corporate-
governance/ethics/ethics. A further example is that of BP plc at: 
http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/sustainability/our-people-and-
values/ethics-and-compliance.html. 
19  Taddia, M., Economic Crime: Corruption Conundrum, (2014) 111(37) Law 
Society’s Gazette 13.  
of publicly available model contracts and private party to party commercial 
contracts. An example of an industry-specific standard contract in the oil 
and gas sector containing an anti-bribery and corruption clause, or ‘abc’ 
clause, is found in the General Conditions of Contract for Services On and 
Off-shore, published by LOGIC.20 The Explanatory Notes to the General 
Conditions refer to the section 9 Guidance: “In drafting Clause 28 [Anti-
Bribery and Corruption] consideration was given to approaches throughout 
the industry to date… In addition, the Ministry of Justice’s publication 
entitled ‘Guidance about procedures which relevant commercial 
organisations can put into place…’ was also considered when developing 
rights such as audit, suspension and termination”.21 Importantly for the 
defence to the section 7 offence, the terms within model contracts may 
oblige parties to state they have not, and will not, be involved in the giving 
or receiving of bribes or other corrupt behaviour, to exercise due diligence 
in regard to sub-contractors and affiliates and to contain sufficient anti-
bribery policies and procedures.  
 
Specific evidence of the amendment of commercial contracts in light of the 
Act is understandably less readily evident than model contracts. This is due 
to their non-public nature. It can be found, however. An instance from the 
public sector is a clause used by the University of Bristol. It has produced a 
standard anti-bribery and corruption clause which inter alia provides that 
the party contracting with the University shall “… comply with all applicable 
laws, statutes, regulations relating to anti-bribery and anti-corruption 
including but not limited to the Bribery Act 2010 and not engage in any 
activity, practice or conduct which would constitute an offence under the 
Bribery Act 2010 if such activity, practice or conduct had been carried out 
in the UK”, and that a breach of the clause shall be deemed a material 
breach and entitle the University to terminate it immediately.22 In the field 
of human resources, Northgate Information Solutions’ December 2012 Anti-
Corruption Policy Statement states that it will abide by the anti-corruption 
laws in every country and in particular the Bribery Act 2010. The Policy 
continues in regard to anti-corruption clauses “Internal legal teams will 
ensure that suitable Anti-Bribery clauses are incorporated into all 
contractual documents with all third parties, including customers, suppliers, 
consultants, advisers etc…. Precedent clauses can be found on the 
Northgate Intranet under the Compliance section”.23  
 
Referring to changes made to contracts in the medical equipment sector 
was the Group Sales Director of Deltex Medical Ltd. in giving evidence to 
the House of Lords Select Committee on Small and Medium Enterprises. He 
stated: “BRIC countries especially raise challenging questions around the 
Bribery Act. My fellow directors and I have concerns over how we operate 
																																																								
20 LOGIC is a subsidiary of the industry body Oil & Gas UK. The clause appears in 
the Third Edition of the General Conditions of Contract, 31 March 2014, at clause 
28, cited at http://www.logic-oil.com/standard-contracts.  
21 Ibid at paragraph 2.15, p 8. 
22 It is cited at http://www.bris.ac.uk/secretary/legal/briberyact/clause.  
23 The policy is dated December 2012, it is found at 
http://www.ngahr.co.uk/sites/master_uk/files/Abridged_Anti_Corruption_Policy_
Statement_07.12.12.pdf. 
correctly under the Bribery Act within those countries. We have taken legal 
advice. We have made changes to our contracts… ”.24 Finally, evidence of 
the effect of the Act in the form of new and revise contractual terms can be 
discerned from the plethora of advice and guidance provided by law firms 
on anti-bribery clauses. The existence of numerous statements and 
publications by law firms and the legal press can, at least in part, be put 
down to the demand by industry to address the Act contractually.25  
 
Effect 4 - Prosecutions and Convictions 
 
Standing in contrast to the effects of the Act identified above in terms of 
scale are the relatively few prosecutions and convictions under it. To-date 
only five individuals have been convicted under the Act.26 Not one of these 
has been in Scotland. Notably, the first charges under the Act brought by 
the Serious Fraud Office in England ended in the convictions in December 
2014 of two persons involved in a £23m fraud involving the promotion and 
selling of South East Asia-based bio-fuel investment products to UK 
investors. This was a case against individuals per se and not a corporation 
under section 7, as indeed have been all of the convictions under the Act.27 
The dearth of prosecutions and convictions exists within a context where 
greater prosecutorial vigour in the area has been noted. It has been stated 
“A significant, sustained increase in international enforcement of anti-
corruption legislation has been evident in the last 10 years. US, UK and 
German authorities, among others, have co-operated to impose criminal 
and other penalties against transnational corporations as well as against 
individual senior executives”.28 The question arising is how are the two facts 
																																																								
24  House of Lords 
Select Committee on Small and Medium Sized Enterprises - Report Roads to 
Success: SME Exports, Feb. 2013, Chapter 10, at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201213/ldselect/ldsmall/131/13114.
htm, at 10.3. 
25 In addition those sources cited above is McInnes, N., Addressing the Bribery Act 
in your Contracts: a Tiered Approach, Practical Law – Construction, June 2012, at 
http://construction.practicallaw.com/blog/construction/pinsents/?p=167.  
26 Damian Green, Minister for Policing, Criminal Justice and Victims, stated in 2013 
“There have been three successful and no unsuccessful prosecutions under the 
Bribery Act 2010 since the act came into force in July 2011”, Hansard 19 July 2013, 
col 159868. Subsequently, on 8 December 2014, two further individuals were 
convicted. 
27 The five convictions are of Munir Patel (Oct. 2011, a court clerk convicted of 
receiving bribes, sentence reduced May 2012 (R. v. Patel (Munir Yakub) [2012] 
EWCA (Crim) 1243), Yang Li (April 2013, pleaded guilty of attempting to bribe a 
university tutor), Mawia Mushtaq (Dec. 2012, pleaded guilty of attempting to bribe 
a driving instructor) and James Whale and Stuart Stone (Dec. 2014, both guilty of 
making and accepting a financial advantage, see The Times 9 Dec. 2014). See in 
regard to the Dec. 2014 convictions the speech of Stuart Alford, Joint Head of Fraud 
at the SFO), at http://www.sfo.gov.uk/about-us/our-views/other-
speeches/speeches-2014/stuart-alford-qc-enforcing-the-uk-bribery-act---the-uk-
serious-fraud-office's-perspective.aspx.  
28 Wells, C., Corporate Criminal Liability – a Ten Year Review, (2014) 12 Crim. L.R. 
849. In regard to prosecution under the Act generally, the Director of the SPO and 
the Director of the DPP have published guidance, Joint Prosecution Guidance of the 
Directory of the SFO and the Director of Public Prosecutions on the Bribery Act 
reconciled? The answer is multifaceted. Relevant factors include the 
considerable difficulties attendant to the detection, investigation and 
prosecution of bribery. The deterrent effect of the Act and the operation of 
the section 9 Guidance may also be factors. Also relevant are the relative 
novelty of the Act, the difficulties attendant to establishing corporate 
criminal liability and the emergence of novel prosecution policies. 
 
The detection of bribery is particularly difficult “… given the secretive 
manner in which it is conducted and that the agreement to gain an unfair 
advantage is often retained between a close number of individuals whether 
acting in their own interest or acting in their capacity of employees of a 
company”.29 In addition, bribery-related crimes do not produce immediate 
and obvious victims, making detection difficult. Investigation can be 
affected where those suspected of bribery hold senior roles and are able to 
disguise or indeed erase evidence of wrong-doing. A pertinent example of 
this very thing is seen in the case of Afren plc, a London-listed oil and gas 
exploration company whose CEO and COO were dismissed for gross 
misconduct by the company in October 2014 upon the discovery of a series 
of ‘unauthorised payments’. 30  Investigative difficulties are exacerbated 
when the conduct is extraterritorial. In such cases inter-state co-operation 
is necessary.31 Relevant here is the extent of the resources available to 
prosecution and investigatory authorities. It has been noted in regard to 
England and Wales that the SFO’s heightened recent activity “… tends to 
suggest that the main reason for the United Kingdom's relatively low level 
of bribery prosecutions in the past has not been the substantive law but an 
unwillingness to devote resources to investigation and enforcement”.32 
Indeed, the resourcing point has been highlighted by the OECD in the 
past.33 
 
Effect 5 – Expansion in Scope of Novel Prosecution Policies  
 
The expansion in the scope of novel prosecution policies is a fifth main effect 
of the Act. Relevant here are corporate self-reporting and deferred 
prosecution agreements (DPAs). Both can be seen as effects of the Act 
because they apply to the offences under it and were, in part, instituted or 
extended on account of it. This is not to suggest that they were introduced 
																																																								
2010, it is cited at: 
http://www.sfo.gov.uk/media/167348/bribery_act_2010_joint_prosecution_guida
nce_of_the_director_of_the_serious_fraud_office_and_the_director_of_public_pr
osecutions.pdf. 
29  Dickson, D.J., Cross Border Investigation and Prosecution of Bribery and 
Corruption Offences, (2014) 15 ERA Forum 51, at p 52. The author has first hand 
prosecutorial experience, being Head of the International Co-operation Unit at the 
Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service. 
30  The company issued a press release on the matter 13 October 2014, at 
http://www.afren.com/.  
31 Dickson, supra note 29, outlines a number of the substantive and institutional 
avenues that exist in the area.  
32 Wells, C., Who’s Afraid of the Bribery Act 2010?, (2012) 5 Journal of Business 
Law 420 at p 431. 
33 Resourcing, corporate criminal liability and the relative novelty of the Act are 
mentioned below. 
following the Act, both pre-date it (in some jurisdictions of the UK) and 
indeed apply to a wider range of crimes than those under the Act.34 It is 
clear, though, that they are intended to enhance the effectiveness of the 
Act. In regard to DPA’s the Ministry of Justice’s Consultation on a New 
Enforcement Tool to Deal with Economic Crime Committed by Commercial 
Organisations: Deferred Prosecution Agreements provides “Although the 
creation under the Bribery Act 2010 of criminal liability for a commercial 
organisation that fails to prevent bribery is a notable improvement and 
although prosecuting agencies are taking more pro-active approaches in 
identifying and investigating serious economic crime, more needs to be 
done”.35 In a Scottish context the self-reporting initiative was brought into 
force on the same day as the Act itself, undoubtedly in an attempt to 
increase its effect. Notably, self-reporting and DPAs do not apply equally as 
between Scotland and the rest of the UK. In general terms, self-reporting 
applies in Scotland and DPAs in the rest of the UK. However, as will be 
mentioned presently, the precise position is not that simple.  
 
The first novel prosecution policy within in the UK applying to bribery was 
self-reporting. It originally applied in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. 
Its first manifestation took the form of SFO guidance issued in 2009. The 
policy, which encouraged civil settlement, has now been withdrawn.36 The 
current SFO policy on the issue is that that there is no presumption in favour 
of civil settlement in any circumstances.37 The general test as to criminal 
prosecution in England and Wales applies, viz. is there sufficient evidence 
to prosecute, and if so, is a prosecution in the public interest? Self-reporting 
may be an “… additional public interest factor against prosecution”. 38 
Summarising the present position the Director of the SFO noted the “SFO's 
message is carefully expressed and nuanced… If a company made a genuine 
self-report to us (that is, told us something we did not already know and 
did so in an open- handed, unspun way), in circumstances where they were 
willing to cooperate in a full investigation and to take steps to prevent 
recurrence, then in those circumstances it is difficult to see that the public 
interest would require a prosecution of the corporate”.39 
																																																								
34 The crimes which may be dealt with by a DPA are specified in paragraphs 15-27 
of schedule 17 to the Crime and Courts Act 2013, with the four bribery offences 
mention in paragraph 26. 
35 Consultation Paper CP9/2012, May 2012, at para 11, it is cited at 
https://consult.justice.gov.uk/digital-communications/deferred-prosecution-
agreements/supporting_documents/deferredprosecutionagreementsconsultation.p
df.  
36 Wells, supra note 32, notes that “The partial reversal since the introduction of 
civil negotiated penalties was a result of pressure from a number of directions 
including the United States, the OECD Convention monitoring group and 
Transparency International”, at p 431. 
37 Joint Prosecution Guidance, supra note 28, at p 5. 
38 DPP, SFO, and Director of the Revenue and Customs Prosecution Office, Joint 
Guidance on Corporate Prosecutions, at page 8, found at 
http://www.sfo.gov.uk/media/65217/joint_guidance_on_corporate_prosecutions.
pdf.  
39 In a speech in October 2013, cited at https://www.sfo.gov.uk/about-us/our-
views/director's-speeches/pinsent-masons-and-legal-week-regulatory-reform-
and-enforcement-conference-.aspx.  
 
The position in Scotland in regard to self-reporting differs markedly. The 
Lord Advocate approved a self-reporting initiative relating to the crimes 
under the Act on the day it entered into force. The initiative remains 
applicable, having been extended to 30 June 2015. Under the initiative 
corporations may self-report bribery offences. This is done on the 
understanding that the case may be referred to the Civil Recovery Unit 
(CRU) for civil settlement in lieu of a criminal prosecution. Self-reporting 
does not bind the Crown and the Lord Advocate remains ‘master of the 
instance’ and may choose to prosecute or not. Self-reporting guidance has 
been published by the Crown Office which specifies the information that 
should be contained with a report and the circumstances in which it should 
be made.40 Notably, there have been two instances of self-reporting in 
Scotland. The first occurred in May 2011, when Abbot Group plc detailed 
corrupt payments made by an overseas subsidiary in 2007. The company, 
a Scottish oil services provider, successfully complied with the Guidance 
and avoided possible criminal liability.41 The second instance was reported 
in December 2014. Aberdeen-based firm International Tubular Services 
admitted benefitting from corrupt payments made by a former employee, 
and remitted £172,000 to the CRU.42 
 
DPAs are somewhat akin to self-reporting in that they are an attempt to 
increase the impact of the criminal law in the corporate sphere. They differ, 
however, in nature and application. Section 45 and schedule 17 of the Crime 
and Courts Act 2013 govern DPAs.43 Whilst both apply throughout the UK, 
the present restriction of ‘designated prosecutors’ to the Director of the SFO 
and DPP mean they may be employed in England and Wales and Northern 
Ireland but not Scotland. The Lord Advocate is not amongst the list of 
designated prosecutors. The recent extension of the self-reporting initiative 
suggests that the inclusion of the Lord Advocate is unlikely. The law 
governing DPAs entered into force 24 February 2014. A DPA is a voluntary 
agreement between a prosecuting authority and a commercial organisation 
whereby, in general terms, the prosecutor agrees to defer prosecution in 
return for the company agreeing to comply with a list of conditions. A DPA 
can only be imposed on a body corporate, partnership or unincorporated 
association. Under a DPA criminal charges are laid but then lay dormant. 
Fixed period terms and conditions are imposed which, if complied with, 
prevent the prosecution being brought. Schedule 17 of the Act provides that 
the DPA must contain a statement of facts, an expiry date and list the 
																																																								
40 Guidance on the Approach of the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service to 
Reporting by Businesses of Bribery Offences, it is found at 
http://www.crownoffice.gov.uk/publications/prosecution-policy-and-guidance. 
41 Note that the corrupt payments were made prior to the entry into force of the 
Act and may not have been criminal under the previous law. 
42  See http://www.copfs.gov.uk/media-site/media-releases/935-aberdeen-
company-pays-over-170-000-after-admitting-bribery-and-corruption-in-
kazakhstan.  
43 See generally on DPAs Bisgrove, M., and Weekes, M., Deferred Prosecution 
Agreements: a Practical Consideration, (2014) 6 Crim LR 416, and Mazzacuva, F., 
Justifications and Purposes of Negotiated Justice for Corporate Offenders: Deferred 
and Non-prosecution Agreements in the UK and US Systems of Criminal Justice, 
(2014) 78(3) Journal of Criminal Law 249. 
factors with which the defendant must comply. Examples of which include 
an obligation to pay a financial penalty, to compensate victims and to 
implement appropriate compliance programmes. There is judicial 
involvement in the process of concluding a DPA. A court must grant 
approval at both a preliminary and final hearing. The agreement must be 
published. No DPAs have been agreed to-date.   
 
Effect 6 – The UK’s International Legal Deficiencies Partially 
Addressed 
 
The furtherance of the UK’s compliance with international law in the area of 
bribery is the final main effect of the Act. Whilst it is beyond the scope of 
this article to address the previous law on bribery and its compatibility with 
international law in detail, that law was widely considered to be at variance 
with the UK’s international legal obligations. 44  The Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), in particular, was quite 
strident as to the deficiencies of UK law and practice. Its 2008 Working 
Group on Bribery highlighted both the UK’s failure to adequately provide for 
effective corporate criminal liability45 as well as several factors related to 
the prosecution of offences. It should be noted that the subject of the 
criticisms was the UK itself, as the state party to the OECD Bribery 
Convention. That noted, the criticisms were largely applicable within a 
Scottish context, as well as the rest of the UK. The Act addresses certain of 
the criticisms. The Scottish Executive stated in the process leading to the 
Act “The Bribery Bill aims to provide a clearer and more effective legal 
framework to combat bribery in both the public and private sectors and will 
assist the United Kingdom, including Scotland, in more effectively fulfilling 
international obligations”.46  
 
The application of the crimes relating to bribery to bodies corporate has 
been altered significantly by the Act. The two general bribery offences and 
the bribery of a foreign public official offence may be committed by a body 
corporate. Liability here relies upon the identification principle whereby 
senior managers within a company are identified as the ‘brains’ or 
‘controlling mind’ of the company. This legal construct has been developed 
in order to satisfy the requirement of the criminal law that an accused act 
with a certain mental state.47 It has been criticised generally and forms a 
																																																								
44 See Arnell, P., and Quiroz-Onate, D., UK Compliance with International Law: 
Bribery and Corruption, (2010) 3(3) Int. J. Liability and Scientific Enquiry 183. 
45 The OECD’s scrutiny of the UK’s law and practice on bribery over the since 1999 
is recorded here http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/unitedkingdom-oecdanti-
briberyconvention.htm   
46 Cited at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/About/Sewel/SessionThree/BriberyBill. The 
international law obligations upon the UK in the area of bribery are generally found 
in three treaties - the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials 1997, the United Nations Convention Against Corruption 2003 and the 
Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption 1999. 
47 See Wells, supra note 37. See also Wells, C., Corporate Criminal Liability in 
England and Wales: Past, Present, and Future, in Pieth M., and Ivory, R., (eds), 
Corporate Criminal Liability - Emergence, Convergence, and Risk, Springer, 
Dordrecht, 2011, Chapter 3. 
part of the OECD’s criticism of the UK.48 The House of Commons Justice 
Committee has noted “Corporate prosecutions for economic crime have in 
the past been rare for various reasons: in particular the difficulties in 
proving the culpability of “directing minds” in the case of alleged fraud 
committed by large enterprises…”.49 The section 7 offence overcomes this 
hurdle. It is in regard to it that the criminal law has been meaningfully 
extended to legal persons. As noted above, the offence is committed where 
relevant commercial organisations fail to prevent bribery. It is a strict 
liability offence – albeit qualified by the adequate procedures defence in 
section 7(2). The Act, therefore, addresses the criticisms in UK law in this 
area and indeed may go beyond what is required.50  
 
The OECD’s prosecution-related criticisms of UK law and practice in the area 
of bribery included the lack of a specialised authority within the UK for the 
purpose of prosecuting bribery, the relevance of extraneous factors to 
prosecution decisions, and the requirement that the Attorney General agree 
to a prosecution. The Act has not created, nor is there otherwise, a single 
specialised authority throughout the UK existing for the purpose of 
prosecuting bribery. To that extent the first criticism remains, and indeed 
will remain. Of course, it is the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service 
(COPFS) that may prosecute within Scotland bribery offences arising in or 
relating to it. As an April 2014 Memorandum of Understanding entitled 
Tackling Foreign Bribery (MOU) provides, the COPFS is “… the lead agency 
for receiving, investigating and prosecuting all allegations or reports of 
foreign bribery in or from Scotland…”.51 In the rest of the UK the SFO has 
that role.52 It does not, however, have exclusive authority throughout the 
rest of the UK. The MOU is illustrative, party to it are not only the COPFS 
and the SFO, but also the City of London Police, the Crown Prosecution 
Service, the Financial Conduct Authority, MoD Police and the National Crime 
Agency. That noted, the MOU goes some way to facilitate co-operation 
between the parties to it, and as the OECD criticism is addressed to an 
extent. Of course the existence of the SFO as a leading specialised agency 
within the rest of the UK is one thing, its ability to function effectively is 
quite another. Relevant here are the resources allocated to it by 
government. These have been decreasing, the monies given to the SFO “… 
																																																								
48 Wells, supra note 28, notes “The United Kingdom came under pressure from the 
OECD Working Group on Bribery, which believed that the identification route to 
corporate liability—which could otherwise apply to bribery offences—was wholly 
inadequate in meeting the UK’s obligations under the Bribery Convention”, at p 
864. 
49 House of Commons Justice Committee, Fraud, Bribery and Money Laundering 
Offences Guideline: Consultation, Report of 2013-2014, 5 Nov. 2013, cited at: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmjust/804/804.p
df. As noted above, the section 7 offence dispenses with this requirement. See also 
Green, D., The Global Financial Crisis: The Case for a Stronger Criminal Response 
(2013) Law and Financial Markets Review 159 at p 164.  
50 Wells, supra note 28, states “This more than satisfies the OECD’s recent Good 
Practice Guidance”, at p 865. 
51  At para 4.5, cited at https://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/mou/mou-
tackling-foreign-bribery.pdf.  
52 Its website contains bribery-specific pages, http://www.sfo.gov.uk/bribery--
corruption/bribery--corruption.aspx.  
have been severely pruned in the last few years. Its budget fell from £51 
million in 2008–2009 to £29 million by 2014–2015”. 53  Indeed, the 
continued existence of the SFO itself is under re-evaluation.54 
 
The prosecution-related criticism of the UK relating to the applicability of 
extraneous factors in decision-making came to prominence in the moves to 
prosecute the arms firm BAE, which eventually ended in a plea bargain deal 
with UK and US authorities.55 At issue specifically was the relevance of the 
UK’s national economic interest to the decision not to continue with a 
criminal investigation. The consideration of national economic interest is in 
conflict with article 5 of the OECD Bribery Convention, which expressly 
provides that it should not be a factor. The rest of the UK has addressed 
this point somewhat by way of a note within the Joint Prosecution Guidance 
that provides “Prosecutors dealing with bribery cases are reminded of the 
UK’s commitment to abide by Article 5 of the OECD 
Convention…”.56However, as that Guidance itself stipulates, prosecution 
decisions in England and Wales are governed by the Code for Crown 
Prosecutors. This entails the established two-stage evidential and public 
interest test. 57  In Scotland the Prosecution Code, published in 2001, 
provides that decisions are based upon legal and public interest 
considerations. The latter are said to include the interests of the ‘wider 
community’ and ‘public concern’.58 It seems doubtful that a prosecution in 
Scotland would turn on Scotland’s, or indeed the UK’s, national economic 
interest. This is not precluded, however. The Lord Advocate’s independence 
and discretion in decision making remains. Finally, the point about the role 
of Attorney-General in decisions has been addressed. Section 10 of the Act 
provides that the Directors of Public Prosecutions for England and Wales, 
Northern Ireland and the SFO must consent to proceedings being 
instituted. 59  The basis of this criticism founded upon the relationship 
between the consent-giver and the government no longer subsists.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The Bribery Act 2010 has had six main effects to-date. These are changes 
to the substantive law, the issuance of guidance by the Ministry of Justice 
																																																								
53 Wells, supra note 28 at p 874. 
54 A review of the institutional arrangements for prosecuting corruption led by Ken 
Clarke was announced in June 2014, see letter by Transparency International and 
others to the Prime Minister 2 October 2014, at http://www.transparency.org.uk/.  
55  The then Director of the SFO’s decision to stop the criminal investigation 
involving Saudi Arabia in 2006 was upheld by the House of Lords in R. (on the 
application of Corner House Research) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office, 
[2008] UKHL 60. See Roberts, A.J., Prosecution: Director of SFO - Lawfulness of 
Decision to Discontinue Prosecution, (2009) 1 Criminal Law Review 46.  
56 Joint Prosecution Guidance on the Bribery Act, supra note 28, at page 5. 
57  The Code is found here: 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/code_for_crown_prosecutors/.  
58  The Prosecution Code is cited at: 
http://www.crownoffice.gov.uk/images/Documents/Prosecution_Policy_Guidance/
Prosecution20Code20_Final20180412__1.pdf.  
59 There is no provision in the section in regard to Scotland - the Crown Office and 
Procurator Fiscal Service remains the sole public prosecutor for all crime. 
and institution of revised compliance programmes by companies, the 
amendment of commercial contracts, several prosecutions and convictions, 
the expansion in scope of new prosecution policies and the UK partially 
addressing its international legal obligations in the area. There are others. 
They have not been discussed presently because they are embryonic, at 
best, or anecdotal. Amongst these are heightened international co-
operation amongst prosecution authorities60, a possible disinclination to 
export on account of the threat of prosecution under the Act61, and an 
increase in relevance of bribery to international arbitral proceedings.62 In 
addition to producing a number of distinct effects the Act has also 
highlighted the differences in law and practice between Scotland and the 
rest of the UK in the area. The applicability of the Act to partnerships in 
Scotland, differences in sentencing practice, and, notably, the distinct 
practice in regard to self-reporting and DPAs are all brought to the fore. The 
results, if any, of these differences – the two instances of self-reporting in 
Scotland excepted – largely remain to be seen. Indeed, as does whether 
the Act will have effect perhaps most reasonably expected from a statute 
introducing new substantive crimes – notable prosecutions and convictions, 
especially of bodies corporate under the section 7 offence. As the Act is not 
retrospective it covers conduct only committed after 1 July 2011. It is in a 
sense, then, still relatively novel. A comparison has been made to US 
experience, with it being noted that “… it takes time to mobilise resources 
to bring cases under a newly enhanced anticorruption law. In the US, for 
example, although the FCPA was enacted in 1977, vigorous enforcement of 
it did not begin until the early 2000s”.63 Only time will tell if Scotland and 
the rest of the UK will follow a path and timescale akin to their transatlantic 
partner.  
																																																								
60 International co-operation in the investigation and prosecution of bribery of 
course pre-dates the Act. A well-known case where it was at issue is R. v Innospec 
Limited [2010] Lloyd's Rep. F.C. 462. Whilst it is reasonable to conclude that the 
greater clarity and scope of the law will lead to increased international co-operation 
there is no hard evidence of this happening to-date. 
61 In August 2013 the Institute of Directors stated that the Act may be discouraging 
SMEs from exporting. White, A., Bribery Act 'needs overhaul’ to help more small 
firms to export, The Telegraph, 27 August 2013. 
62  In Interprods Limited v De La Rue International Limited [2014] EWHC 68 
(Comm) the High Court considered an argument that an act of bribery had the 
effect of depriving an arbitral tribunal of jurisdiction.  
63 DiBianco, G., et al, Bribery Act 2010: Still a Sleeping Giant, 23 October 2014, 
Practical Law Magazine, cited at http://uk.practicallaw.com/8-584-9550. 
